Cooperative teaching and learning of actions
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6063108
DOI10.1007/s00199-023-01497-xzbMath1530.91057MaRDI QIDQ6063108
Publication date: 7 November 2023
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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