Cooperative teaching and learning of actions

DOI10.1007/s00199-023-01497-xzbMath1530.91057MaRDI QIDQ6063108

Yangbo Song, Mofei Zhao

Publication date: 7 November 2023

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

finitely repeated gamesstrict efficiencyrational cooperationacquisition of action

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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