A folk theorem for stochastic games with finite horizon

DOI10.1007/s00199-015-0862-2zbMath1319.91028OpenAlexW2130816256MaRDI QIDQ2343480

Chantal Marlats

Publication date: 5 May 2015

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-015-0862-2

zbMATH Keywords

stochastic gamescooperationfolk theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (3)

Cooperative teaching and learning of actions ⋮ Asynchronous games with transfers: uniqueness and optimality ⋮ Perturbed finitely repeated games

Cites Work

• Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames
• A dynamic model of duopoly with customer loyalties
• The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies
• A folk theorem for stochastic games
• Recursive Methods in Discounted Stochastic Games: An Algorithm forδ→ 1 and a Folk Theorem
• Finitely Repeated Games
• The Asymptotic Theory of Stochastic Games
• Dynamic Voluntary Contribution to a Public Project
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• Gradualism and Irreversibility
• Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem

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