Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(85)90051-1zbMath0585.90104OpenAlexW1965049303MaRDI QIDQ1071665

James W. Friedman

Publication date: 1985

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(85)90051-1

zbMATH Keywords

multiple equilibrianoncooperative gameexistence of equilibriarepeated gametrigger strategycooperative equilibriafinite horizon noncooperative supergames

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (10)

Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications ⋮ Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games ⋮ Modeling finitely-repeated games with uncertain termination ⋮ Finite rationalizability and cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma ⋮ Pareto efficiency, simple game stability, and social structure in finitely repeated games ⋮ Continuous time vs. backward induction ⋮ A repeated game with finitely lived overlapping generations of players ⋮ THE FIRM AS A NEXUS OF STRATEGIES ⋮ Repeated implementation ⋮ A folk theorem for stochastic games with finite horizon

Cites Work

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• Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games
• Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
• Noncooperative price taking in large dynamic markets
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games

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