THE FIRM AS A NEXUS OF STRATEGIES

DOI10.1142/S0219198904000344zbMath1101.91056MaRDI QIDQ4675821

Gregory K. Dow

Publication date: 6 May 2005

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamestransferable utilityincentive constraintsimplicit contractsteam productionself-enforcementTheory of the firm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
• Finitely Repeated Games
• Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
• Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment
• Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence
• The Long Side of the Market and the Short End of the Stick: Bargaining Power and Price Formation in Buyers', Sellers', and Balanced Markets
• Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts
• The Fair Wage-Effort Hypothesis and Unemployment

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