Continuous time vs. backward induction

DOI10.1016/0165-1889(94)00837-8zbMATH Open0900.90131OpenAlexW2067834887MaRDI QIDQ672679FDOQ672679

Authors: John R. Conlon 

Publication date: 28 February 1997

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1889(94)00837-8

Recommendations

• Reputation in continuous-time games
• Continuous Time Repeated Games
• Reputation and impermanent types
• Bargaining and Reputation
• Reputation in dynamic games

zbMATH Keywords

finite time horizonBackwards inductionContinuous timePredatory pricingReputation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic growth models (91B62)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The chain store paradox
• Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
• Extensive Form Games in Continuous Time: Pure Strategies
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Continuous Time Repeated Games
• Finitely Repeated Games
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Reputation and imperfect information
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergames
• Repeated games with asymptotically finite horizons
• Delaying or deterring entry. A game-theoretic analysis

This page was built for publication: Continuous time vs. backward induction

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q672679)