Reputation and impermanent types

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2007.04.002MaRDI QIDQ2483124zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Thomas Wiseman

Publication date 28 April 2008

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2007.04.002

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Recommendations

• Impermanent types and permanent reputations
• Reputation in dynamic games
• Bounded memory and permanent reputations
• On "Reputation" Refinements with Heterogeneous Beliefs
• A note on reputation: more on the chain-store paradox

Cites work

• Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks
• Commitment, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Disappearing private reputations in long-run relationships
• Firm reputation with hidden information
• Game theory
• Imperfect Monitoring and Impermanent Reputations
• Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
• Public trust and government betrayal
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
• Reputation and entry deterrence under short-run ownership of a firm
• Reputation and imperfect information
• The chain store paradox
• Who wants a good reputation?

Cited in

(16)

• Reputation building through costly adjustment
• Disappearance of reputations in two-sided incomplete-information games
• REPUTATION BY IMITATION: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL WITH STRATEGIC MATCHING
• Bounded memory and permanent reputations
• The dynamics of reputations
• Limited records and reputation bubbles
• Impermanent types and permanent reputations
• The dynamics of collective reputation
• Multiple rounds in a chain store game
• Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents
• Sustainable reputations with rating systems
• Reputation and exogenous private learning
• Occurrence of deception under the oversight of a regulator having reputation concerns
• Too good to be truthful: why competent advisers are fired
• Markov games with frequent actions and incomplete information -- the limit case
• Bounded memory and incomplete information

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