Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
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Publication:3142517
DOI10.2307/2951492zbMath0793.90106OpenAlexW3125686698MaRDI QIDQ3142517
Publication date: 20 December 1993
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/895.pdf
Bayesian learningexpected utilitysubjective beliefsrational learninginfinitely repeated gameNash equilibrium of the repeated game
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