Learning to learn, pattern recognition, and Nash equilibrium

DOI10.1006/game.1997.0532zbMath0871.90112OpenAlexW2088924845MaRDI QIDQ1357407

Doron Sonsino

Publication date: 10 June 1997

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/1ae36b7ca59258bcacf16875ea9adebe5b1dc8fa

zbMATH Keywords

pure strategy Nash equilibriastrategic-form gamesbounded-rationality, probabilistic learning models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40)

Related Items (7)

Exploitable actions of believers in the ``law of small numbers in repeated constant-sum games ⋮ Pattern recognition and subjective belief learning in a repeated constant-sum game ⋮ Strategic pattern recognition -- experimental evidence. ⋮ Beyond fictitious play beliefs: incorporating pattern recognition and similarity matching ⋮ Evidence for learning to learn behavior in normal form games ⋮ Conditional universal consistency. ⋮ The role of absolute continuity in merging of opinions and rational learning

Cites Work

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• Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
• Learning mixed equilibria
• Three problems in learning mixed-strategy Nash equilibria
• Discrete sequence prediction and its applications
• Learning in extensive-form games. I: Self-confirming equilibria
• Subjective games and equilibria
• Fictitious play property for games with identical interests
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Equilibrium points in n -person games

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