Pattern recognition and subjective belief learning in a repeated constant-sum game
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 18237 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3457895 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1233801 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2017771 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1832191 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1907684 (Why is no real title available?)
- A learning-based model of repeated games with incomplete information
- An Evaluation of Econometric Models of Adaptive Learning
- An Experimental Study of Belief Learning Using Elicited Beliefs
- An introduction to model selection
- Cross-validation methods
- Do we detect and exploit mixed strategy play by opponents?
- Does experience teach? professionals and minimax play in the lab
- Evolution of beliefs and the Nash equilibrium of normal form games
- Experience-weighted Attraction Learning in Normal Form Games
- Games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria: An experimental study
- Individual learning in normal form games: Some laboratory results
- Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
- Learning to learn, pattern recognition, and Nash equilibrium
- Microeconometrics
- Nonmetric test of the minimax theory of two-person zerosum games.
- Practical Genetic Algorithms
- Professionals Play Minimax
- Quantal response equilibria for normal form games
- Separating latent classes by information criteria
- Some recent research in the analysis of mixture distributions
- Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games
- Stated beliefs versus inferred beliefs: a methodological inquiry and experimental test
- Strategic pattern recognition -- experimental evidence.
- The perception of randomness
- Theories of Learning in Games and Heterogeneity Bias
- What determines the shape of the probability weighting function under uncertainty?
- What happens in the field stays in the field: exploring whether professionals play minimax in laboratory experiments
Cited in
(7)- Learning to believe in simple equilibria in a complex OLG economy -- evidence from the lab
- Meaningful learning in weighted voting games: an experiment
- The control of game form recognition in experiments: Understanding dominant strategy failures in a simple two person ``guessing game
- Game theory-inspired evolutionary algorithm for global optimization
- Beyond fictitious play beliefs: incorporating pattern recognition and similarity matching
- A generalized approach to belief learning in repeated games
- Strategic pattern recognition -- experimental evidence.
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