Pattern recognition and subjective belief learning in a repeated constant-sum game
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Publication:423770
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2012.01.005zbMATH Open1251.91014OpenAlexW3122798008MaRDI QIDQ423770FDOQ423770
Authors: Leonidas Spiliopoulos
Publication date: 4 June 2012
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.01.005
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Cited In (7)
- The control of game form recognition in experiments: Understanding dominant strategy failures in a simple two person ``guessing game
- Learning to believe in simple equilibria in a complex OLG economy -- evidence from the lab
- Beyond fictitious play beliefs: incorporating pattern recognition and similarity matching
- A generalized approach to belief learning in repeated games
- Game theory-inspired evolutionary algorithm for global optimization
- Strategic pattern recognition -- experimental evidence.
- Meaningful learning in weighted voting games: an experiment
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