The control of game form recognition in experiments: Understanding dominant strategy failures in a simple two person ``guessing game

DOI10.1007/s10683-008-9206-4zbMath1175.91048OpenAlexW2105940947MaRDI QIDQ2271097

Margaret McConnell, Eileen Chou, Charles R. Plott, Rosemarie Nagel

Publication date: 6 August 2009

Published in: Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/79564/

zbMATH Keywords

experimentsmethodologygamesinstructions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Cites Work

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• `Learning' with no feedback in a competitive guessing game.
• On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
• The two-person beauty contest
• Boundedly rational rule learning in a guessing game
• Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk
• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games

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