What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis

DOI10.1007/S10058-014-0162-5zbMath1329.91028OpenAlexW3123013259MaRDI QIDQ2254242

Adam Zylbersztejn, Nicolas Jacquemet

Publication date: 4 February 2015

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01026080/file/RosenthalRED.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

inequality aversionsubgame perfectnesscoordination failuresocial preferenceslaboratory experimentsnon-credible threats

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (2)

Cognitive ability and the effect of strategic uncertainty ⋮ Learning, Words and Actions: Experimental Evidence on Coordination-Improving Information

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