What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis
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Publication:2254242
DOI10.1007/s10058-014-0162-5zbMath1329.91028OpenAlexW3123013259MaRDI QIDQ2254242
Adam Zylbersztejn, Nicolas Jacquemet
Publication date: 4 February 2015
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01026080/file/RosenthalRED.pdf
inequality aversionsubgame perfectnesscoordination failuresocial preferenceslaboratory experimentsnon-credible threats
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