Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox

Cites Work

Title not available (Why is that?)
The chain store paradox
Title not available (Why is that?)
Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

Cited In (only showing first 100 items - show all)

Iterated weak dominance in strictly competitive games of perfect information.
An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
Optimal stealing time
Common belief of rationality in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
Robert W. Rosenthal (1945--2002)
Reasoning about games
Contextual Mechanism Design
The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology
Keep `hoping' for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox
Theoretical tools for understanding and aiding dynamic decision making
Equilibrium selection in bargaining models.
Learning in experimental games
The gradual decline of cooperation: Endgame effects in evolutionary game theory
On the centipede game
A note on robustness of equilibria with respect to commitment opportunities
On rationalizability in extensive games
The dynamic (in)stability of backwards induction
Best-reply matching in games.
Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game
The cognitive foundations of tacit commitments: a virtual bargaining model of dynamic interactions
A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction
Market oscillations induced by the competition between value-based and trend-based investment strategies
Two game models for cooperation with implicit noncooperation
Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight
Evolutionary exploration of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma -- the effect of out-of-equilibrium play
On the non-existence of a rationality definition for extensive games
Self-admissible sets
On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
Implementation by iterative dominance and backward induction: An experimental comparison
A theory of sequential reciprocity
From Common Knowledge of Rationality to Backward Induction
Statistical inference and modelling of momentum in stock prices
Clock games: theory and experiments
The give and take game: analysis of a resource sharing game
Aversion to norm-breaking: A model
Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observed in the centipede game
Reasoning about rationality
Non-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality
Demons and repentance
A note on the equilibria of the unbounded traveler's dilemma
An experimental study of constant-sum centipede games
The critical discount factor as a measure for cartel stability?
Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game.
On the centipede game with a social norm
Rethinking common belief, revision, and backward induction
Computation as a correlation device
Logic and social cognition. The facts matter, and so do computational models
A bounded-rationality approach to the study of noncooperative games
Bidding games and efficient allocations
Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
Reputation and imperfect information
How to convince someone that you can be trusted? The role of ‘hostages’
A payoff uncertainty explanation of results in experimental centipede games
Bargaining under a deadline: Evidence from the reverse ultimatum game.
The strength of a little perfection
Herding and the winner's curse in markets with sequential bids
Learning to apply theory of mind
Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
On the role of fairness and limited backward induction in sequential bargaining games. New behavioral models and analyses
The predictive power of price patterns
Experimental results on the centipede game in normal form: an investigation on learning
Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games
Iterated regret minimization: a new solution concept
The chain-store paradox revisited
Behavior in the centipede game: a decision-theoretical perspective
Delay to deal: bargaining with indivisibility and round-dependent transfer
Title not available (Why is that?)
Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm
REPUTATION BY IMITATION: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL WITH STRATEGIC MATCHING
Three steps ahead
The absent-minded centipede
Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics
Title not available (Why is that?)
Polyequilibrium
An automated method for building cognitive models for turn-based games from a strategy logic
The effect of sanctions on the evolution of cooperation in linear division of labor
Learning, words and actions: experimental evidence on coordination-improving information
Conservative belief and rationality
King of the Hill: giving backward induction its best shot
THE E-MAIL GAME REVISITED — MODELING ROUGH INDUCTIVE REASONING
Cognitive hierarchies for games in extensive form
Studying strategies and types of players: experiments, logics and cognitive models
What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis
Cycles of learning in the centipede game
THE FORGIVING TRIGGER STRATEGY: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE TRIGGER STRATEGY
Competitive centipede games: zero-end payoffs and payoff inequality deter reciprocal cooperation
A note on disbelief in others regarding backward induction
Uncertain information structures and backward induction
"MAY I PLEASE PAY A HIGHER PRICE?": SUSTAINING NON-SIMULTANEOUS EXCHANGE THROUGH FREE DISPOSAL OF BARGAINING ADVANTAGE
Backward induction with players who doubt others' faultlessness
Equilibria in a dynamic model of coordination of two firms with nonfixed prices
Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies in Well-Founded Games
``Test two, choose the better leads to high cooperation in the centipede game
Almost strict competitiveness in extensive games
Non-equilibrium play in centipede games
A note on stabilizing cooperation in the centipede game
A game-theoretic analysis of cross-ledger swaps with packetized payments

This page was built for publication: Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1156089)