Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3137856 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3288322 (Why is no real title available?)
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
- The chain store paradox
Cited in
(only showing first 100 items - show all)- Understanding dynamic interactions
- The predictive power of price patterns
- Generalized backward induction: justification for a folk algorithm
- Experimental results on the centipede game in normal form: an investigation on learning
- An epistemic approach to stochastic games
- A theory of simplicity in games and mechanism design
- Sophisticated experience-weighted attraction learning and strategic teaching in repeated games
- Iterated regret minimization: a new solution concept
- The chain-store paradox revisited
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7500541 (Why is no real title available?)
- Limited foresight equilibrium
- Behavior in the centipede game: a decision-theoretical perspective
- Iterated weak dominance in strictly competitive games of perfect information.
- Relational utility and social norms in games
- Tenable threats when Nash equilibrium is the norm
- Delay to deal: bargaining with indivisibility and round-dependent transfer
- REPUTATION BY IMITATION: AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL WITH STRATEGIC MATCHING
- Optimal stealing time
- The absent-minded centipede
- Three steps ahead
- An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
- Common belief of rationality in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
- Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics
- Robert W. Rosenthal (1945--2002)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 7689788 (Why is no real title available?)
- Reasoning about games
- Polyequilibrium
- The power of paradox: some recent developments in interactive epistemology
- Keep `hoping' for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox
- Theoretical tools for understanding and aiding dynamic decision making
- Equilibrium selection in bargaining models.
- Payoffs, intensionality and abstraction in games
- Learning in experimental games
- An automated method for building cognitive models for turn-based games from a strategy logic
- The gradual decline of cooperation: Endgame effects in evolutionary game theory
- On the centipede game
- The effect of sanctions on the evolution of cooperation in linear division of labor
- A note on robustness of equilibria with respect to commitment opportunities
- On rationalizability in extensive games
- The dynamic (in)stability of backwards induction
- Best-reply matching in games.
- King of the Hill: giving backward induction its best shot
- Learning, words and actions: experimental evidence on coordination-improving information
- Conservative belief and rationality
- A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction
- The cognitive foundations of tacit commitments: a virtual bargaining model of dynamic interactions
- Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game
- Two game models for cooperation with implicit noncooperation
- THE E-MAIL GAME REVISITED — MODELING ROUGH INDUCTIVE REASONING
- Market oscillations induced by the competition between value-based and trend-based investment strategies
- Cognitive hierarchies for games in extensive form
- Studying strategies and types of players: experiments, logics and cognitive models
- Cycles of learning in the centipede game
- What drives failure to maximize payoffs in the lab? A test of the inequality aversion hypothesis
- Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
- Do players reason by forward induction in dynamic perfect information games?
- Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight
- On the non-existence of a rationality definition for extensive games
- THE FORGIVING TRIGGER STRATEGY: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE TRIGGER STRATEGY
- Evolutionary exploration of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma -- the effect of out-of-equilibrium play
- Self-admissible sets
- Epistemic foundation of the backward induction paradox
- On the epistemic foundation for backward induction
- Implementation by iterative dominance and backward induction: An experimental comparison
- Competitive centipede games: zero-end payoffs and payoff inequality deter reciprocal cooperation
- A theory of sequential reciprocity
- The give and take game: analysis of a resource sharing game
- Clock games: theory and experiments
- A note on disbelief in others regarding backward induction
- Aversion to norm-breaking: A model
- From Common Knowledge of Rationality to Backward Induction
- Uncertain information structures and backward induction
- Statistical inference and modelling of momentum in stock prices
- Backward induction with players who doubt others' faultlessness
- Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty
- "MAY I PLEASE PAY A HIGHER PRICE?": SUSTAINING NON-SIMULTANEOUS EXCHANGE THROUGH FREE DISPOSAL OF BARGAINING ADVANTAGE
- ``Test two, choose the better leads to high cooperation in the centipede game
- Contextual mechanism design
- Almost strict competitiveness in extensive games
- Evolutionary dynamics in finite populations can explain the full range of cooperative behaviors observed in the centipede game
- Equilibria in a dynamic model of coordination of two firms with nonfixed prices
- Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies in Well-Founded Games
- Non-equilibrium play in centipede games
- Reasoning about rationality
- Demons and repentance
- A note on stabilizing cooperation in the centipede game
- A note on the equilibria of the unbounded traveler's dilemma
- Non-Bayesian correlated equilibrium as an expression of non-Bayesian rationality
- A game-theoretic analysis of cross-ledger swaps with packetized payments
- The critical discount factor as a measure for cartel stability?
- An experimental study of constant-sum centipede games
- COMPETITION OR CO‐OPERATION: ON THE EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS OF TRUST, EXPLOITATION AND MORAL ATTITUDES
- Bounded rationality and learning. Introduction
- Equilibrium play and adaptive learning in a three-person centipede game.
- On the centipede game with a social norm
- Rethinking common belief, revision, and backward induction
- Logic and social cognition. The facts matter, and so do computational models
- Computation as a correlation device
- A bounded-rationality approach to the study of noncooperative games
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
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