A note on disbelief in others regarding backward induction
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Summary: We present experimental results on the role of beliefs in the cognitive ability of others in a problem involving backward induction. Using a modified version of the so-called race game, our design allows the effects of a player's own inability to perform backward induction to be separated from the effects of her disbelief in the ability of others to do so. We find that behavior is responsive to the dependence on others who might fail in backward induction as well as information regarding their backward induction skills.
Recommendations
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Cites work
- An experimental study of constant-sum centipede games
- An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game
- Experimental results on the centipede game in normal form: an investigation on learning
- Games of perfect information, predatory pricing and the chain-store paradox
- On the persistence of strategic sophistication
- Playing the wrong game: an experimental analysis of relational complexity and strategic misrepresentation
- The control of game form recognition in experiments: Understanding dominant strategy failures in a simple two person ``guessing game
- What happens in the field stays in the field: exploring whether professionals play minimax in laboratory experiments
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