On the persistence of strategic sophistication

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Publication:900434

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.012zbMath1330.91016OpenAlexW2111267728MaRDI QIDQ900434

Sotiris Georganas, Paul J. Healy, Roberto A. Weber

Publication date: 22 December 2015

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/12715/1/Georganas_Healy_Weber-LevelKTests.pdf




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