Coordination under limited depth of reasoning

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.011zbMath1347.91016OpenAlexW2259744044MaRDI QIDQ263373

Terri Kneeland

Publication date: 5 April 2016

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1474662/

zbMATH Keywords

coordination gamescognitive hierarchy modelsglobal gameslevel-\(k\) models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Economics of information (91B44)

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