Coordination under limited depth of reasoning

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.12.011MaRDI QIDQ263373zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Terri Kneeland

Publication date 5 April 2016

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1474662/

zbMATH Keywords

cognitive hierarchy modelscoordination gamesglobal gameslevel-\(k\) models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 679850 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
• Bayes theory
• Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• Imperfect choice or imperfect attention? Understanding strategic thinking in private information games
• Level-\(k\) reasoning in a generalized beauty contest
• Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
• Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games
• On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
• Private and public information in self-fulfilling currency crises
• The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information

Cited in

(7)

• Reflexive games in the linear Stackelberg duopoly models under incoincident reflexion ranks
• Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games
• Rational coordination with no communication or conventions
• Equilibria in the Stackelberg oligopoly reflexive games with different marginal costs of agents
• Modeling reflexion in the nonlinear model of the Stackelberg three-agent oligopoly for the Russian telecommunication market
• Limited Depth of Reasoning and Failure of Cascade Formation in the Laboratory
• On the persistence of strategic sophistication

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