Coordination under limited depth of reasoning
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Publication:263373
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2015.12.011zbMATH Open1347.91016OpenAlexW2259744044MaRDI QIDQ263373FDOQ263373
Authors: Terri Kneeland 
Publication date: 5 April 2016
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/id/eprint/1474662/
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- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 699704
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- Coordination Capacity
- The complexity of almost-optimal simultaneous coordination
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Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Economics of information (91B44)
Cites Work
- On players' models of other players: Theory and experimental evidence
- Level-\(k\) reasoning in a generalized beauty contest
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- Measuring Strategic Uncertainty in Coordination Games
- Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Imperfect choice or imperfect attention? Understanding strategic thinking in private information games
- A Cognitive Hierarchy Model of Games
- Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?
- The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information
- Private and public information in self-fulfilling currency crises
- Bayes theory
Cited In (7)
- Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games
- Reflexive games in the linear Stackelberg duopoly models under incoincident reflexion ranks
- Limited Depth of Reasoning and Failure of Cascade Formation in the Laboratory
- Modeling reflexion in the nonlinear model of the Stackelberg three-agent oligopoly for the Russian telecommunication market
- Equilibria in the Stackelberg oligopoly reflexive games with different marginal costs of agents
- On the persistence of strategic sophistication
- Rational coordination with no communication or conventions
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