Equilibrium selection in static and dynamic entry games
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Cites work
- A Herding Perspective on Global Games and Multiplicity
- Dynamic Global Games of Regime Change: Learning, Multiplicity, and the Timing of Attacks
- Dynamic coordination games
- Dynamic coordination with individual learning
- Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
- Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
- The Theory of Global Games on Test: Experimental Analysis of Coordination Games with Public and Private Information
Cited in
(15)- EFFICIENCY IN DYNAMIC ENTRY GAMES: THE CASE OF QUANTITY COMPETITION
- Experimental evidence of bank runs as pure coordination failures
- Equilibrium Selection in Auctions and High Stakes Games
- Does informational equivalence preserve strategic behavior? Experimental results on Trockel's model of Selten's chain store story
- Sentiments, strategic uncertainty, and information structures in coordination games
- Equilibrium play in large group market entry games
- Bounded memory, inertia, sampling and weighting model for market entry games
- Equilibrium selection in games: the mollifier method
- Characterising equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities
- Equilibrium selection in experimental games with recommended play
- The effect of endogenous timing on coordination under asymmetric information: an experimental study
- Efficient entry
- Entry and structures of interest groups in assignment games
- Coordination under limited depth of reasoning
- Equilibrium selection under changes in endowments: a geometric approach
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