Equilibrium selection in games: the mollifier method
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2003.10.005zbMATH Open1114.91008OpenAlexW2137564301MaRDI QIDQ2486410FDOQ2486410
Authors: Lia van Wesenbeeck, Michiel Keyzer 
Publication date: 5 August 2005
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.10.005
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Non-cooperative gamesKernel density estimationRefinementsBest-response dynamicsMollifier methodNonstationary stochastic approximationStochastic quasi gradient methods (SQG)
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Cited In (3)
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