On stability of perfect equilibrium points
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Cites work
- Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
- Non-cooperative games
- On the subject of non optimal play in zero sum extensive games: 'The trap phenomenon'
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
Cited in
(41)- Non-cooperative two-person games in biology: A classification
- Perfect equilibrium points and lexicographic domination
- On the robustness of equilibrium refinements
- Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development
- A note on the perfectness concept and the information structures of games
- Two-person bargaining behavior in fixed discounting factors games with infinite horizon
- Imperfectly observable commitments in n-player games
- The theory of normal form games from the differentiable viewpoint
- Neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk coordination games
- Pareto equilibria for bimatrix games
- Existence of nontrivial equilibria in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring.
- Weakly strict equilibria in finite normal form games
- On strictly proper equilibria
- On the incentive properties of multi-item auctions.
- Extended proper equilibrium
- The trembling chairman paradox
- Regular potential games
- Continuity and equilibrium stability
- Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium: a learning approach via costs to move
- Equilibrium selection in interdependent value auctions
- Information structures and decentralizability of equilibria
- The maximum entropy approach in production frontier estimation
- Perfect and limit admissible perfect equilibria in discontinuous games
- Stability and trembles in extensive-form games
- Robustness to strategic uncertainty
- Electing a parliament
- Equilibrium selection in games: the mollifier method
- Are strictly perfect equilibria proper? A counterexample
- Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
- FRIENDLINESS AND RECIPROCITY IN EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
- Three steps ahead
- Evolution of preferences in multiple populations
- Refinements of equilibria for population games based on bounded rationality of agents
- Resolution of the \(n\)-person prisoners' dilemma by Kalai's preplay negotiation procedure
- Sequentially stable outcomes
- A rational way of playing: revision theory for strategic interaction
- Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games
- Strictly perfect equilibrium points of bimatrix games
- Entropy control costs and entropic equilibria
- A choice of auction format in seller cheating: a signaling game analysis
- Slightly altruistic equilibria
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