Are strictly perfect equilibria proper? A counterexample

DOI10.1007/BF02192256MaRDI QIDQ2565010zbMATH OpenWikidataFDO

Authors A. J. Vermeulen, M. J. M. Jansen

Publication date 7 January 1997

Published in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

bimatrix gamesstrategic stabilitystrictly perfect equilibriumproper equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Recommendations

• On essential, (strictly) perfect equilibria
• On strictly proper equilibria
• Existence of perfect equilibria: a direct proof
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 66875
• On the equivalence between (quasi-)perfect and sequential equilibria
• Effectively complete equilibria -- A note
• A characterization of quasi-perfect equilibria
• On modifications of the concepts of perfect and proper equilibria
• On non-existence of pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium
• A note on perfect correlated equilibria

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4141836 (Why is no real title available?)
• On stability of perfect equilibrium points
• On strictly proper equilibria
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

Cited in

(5)

• Fall back equilibrium
• Continuity and equilibrium stability
• How proper is sequential equilibrium?
• The trembling chairman paradox
• Fall back equilibrium for \(2 \times n\) bimatrix games

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