Are strictly perfect equilibria proper? A counterexample

DOI10.1007/BF02192256zbMATH Open0866.90142WikidataQ124966527 ScholiaQ124966527MaRDI QIDQ2565010FDOQ2565010

Authors: A. J. Vermeulen, M. J. M. Jansen 

Publication date: 7 January 1997

Published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

bimatrix gamesstrategic stabilitystrictly perfect equilibriumproper equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Cites Work

• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On stability of perfect equilibrium points
• On strictly proper equilibria

Cited In (5)

• Fall back equilibrium
• Continuity and equilibrium stability
• How proper is sequential equilibrium?
• The trembling chairman paradox
• Fall back equilibrium for \(2 \times n\) bimatrix games

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