Continuity and equilibrium stability

DOI10.1016/j.jmaa.2013.03.037zbMath1306.91005OpenAlexW2057334900MaRDI QIDQ2257195

Iryna Topolyan, Charalambos D. Aliprantis

Publication date: 24 February 2015

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmaa.2013.03.037

zbMATH Keywords

unit simplexbest response correspondencestrictly perfect equilibriumstrictly proper equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• On `informationally robust equilibria' for bimatrix games
• On stability of perfect equilibrium points
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• The expectational stability of Walrasian equilibria
• An ``informationally robust equilibrium for two-person nonzero-sum games
• On strictly proper equilibria
• Are strictly perfect equilibria proper? A counterexample
• Non-cooperative games
• Strongly Stable Equilibrium Points of N-Person Noncooperative Games
• Sequential Equilibria
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
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