On stability of perfect equilibrium points
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Publication:1159088
DOI10.1007/BF01769260zbMath0474.90087OpenAlexW1970764346MaRDI QIDQ1159088
Publication date: 1981
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01769260
stabilitynoncooperative gamegame in extensive formsequence of perturbed gamesn-person gamesirrational movesnoncooperative solution conceptsperfect equilibrium pointslight imperfections of rationalitystrictly perfect equilibrium point
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Cites Work
- Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
- On the subject of non optimal play in zero sum extensive games: 'The trap phenomenon'
- Games with randomly disturbed payoffs: a new rationale for mixed-strategy equilibrium points
- Non-cooperative games
- Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept
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