Evolution of preferences in multiple populations

DOI10.1007/s00182-023-00869-wzbMath1529.91011arXiv1808.02451OpenAlexW4386498225MaRDI QIDQ6146793

Yu-Sung Tu, Wei-Torng Juang

Publication date: 31 January 2024

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1808.02451

zbMATH Keywords

observabilityevolutionary stabilityasymmetric gameevolution of preferencesindirect evolutionary approach

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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