Stability and trembles in extensive-form games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2013.12.011MaRDI QIDQ2442830zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yuval Heller

Publication date 1 April 2014

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/48160/1/MPRA_paper_48160.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary stabilityextensive-form gameslimit ESS

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites work

• Does neutral stability imply Lyapunov stability?
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Evolutionarily stable strategies in the repeated prisoner's dilemma
• Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
• Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4141836 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078991 (Why is no real title available?)
• Local stability of smooth selection dynamics for normal form games
• Local stability under evolutionary game dynamics
• Noisy communication and the evolution of cooperation
• On stability of perfect equilibrium points
• On the neutral stability of mixed strategies in asymmetric contests
• The logic of animal conflict
• Three steps ahead

Cited in

(8)

• Limit evolutionarily stable strategies in two-player, normal form games
• Evolutionary game theory: a renaissance
• A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games
• Institutional inertia and institutional change in an expanding normal-form game
• Rule rationality
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 18239 (Why is no real title available?)
• Three steps ahead
• Evolution of preferences in multiple populations

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