Homo Moralis--Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching

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Publication:5397563

DOI10.3982/ECTA10637zbMath1287.91041OpenAlexW2148900998MaRDI QIDQ5397563

Ingela Alger, Joergen W. Weibull

Publication date: 24 February 2014

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta10637




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