Evolution of risk-taking behaviour and status preferences in anti-coordination games

DOI10.1007/s13235-023-00537-4arXiv2011.02740OpenAlexW4388017996MaRDI QIDQ6124793

Manuel Staab

Publication date: 2 April 2024

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.02740

zbMATH Keywords

evolution of preferencesrisk-takingrelative consumptionsocial statusanti-coordination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

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• Status, the Distribution of Wealth, Private and Social Attitudes to Risk
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Homo Moralis--Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching
• Information-Based Relative Consumption Effects
• Evolution of Preferences1

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