Evil green beards: tag recognition can also be used to withhold cooperation in structured populations
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Publication:739687
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.07.002zbMath1343.92408WikidataQ50453166 ScholiaQ50453166MaRDI QIDQ739687
Julián García, Arne Traulsen, Matthijs van Veelen
Publication date: 19 August 2016
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.07.002
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