Stability by mutation in evolutionary games
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Publication:1906709
DOI10.1006/game.1995.1047zbMath0840.90141OpenAlexW2033123136MaRDI QIDQ1906709
Reinhard Bürger, Immanuel M. Bomze
Publication date: 6 February 1996
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1995.1047
Problems related to evolution (92D15) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Games with infinitely many players (91A07)
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