Strictly dominated strategies in the replicator-mutator dynamics

DOI10.3390/G2030355zbMATH Open1311.91033OpenAlexW2079768877MaRDI QIDQ2344985FDOQ2344985

Authors: Segismundo S. Izquierdo, Luis R. Izquierdo 

Publication date: 19 May 2015

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g2030355

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zbMATH Keywords

dominated strategiesreplicator-mutatorlimit rest pointslimit stationary states

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Domination or equilibrium
• Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games
• A simple model for the balance between selection and mutation
• Sex and evolutionary stability
• Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics
• Mutation in autocatalytic reaction networks. An analysis based on perturbation theory
• Dynamics of small autocatalytic reaction networks. II: Replication, mutation and catalysis
• Feasibility of communication in binary signaling games
• Evolution of universal grammar
• The selection mutation equation
• Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Evolutionary selection against dominated strategies
• Stability by mutation in evolutionary games
• Evolutionary dynamics of Lewis signaling games: Signaling systems vs. partial pooling
• A rapid-mutation approximation for cell population dynamics
• The influence of mutation on autocatalytic reaction networks

Cited In (6)

• Effects of attitudes on the evolution of cooperation on complex networks
• Stability and convergence analysis of a variable order replicator-mutator process in a moving medium
• Truncation selection and payoff distributions applied to the replicator equation
• Markovian switching of mutation rates in evolutionary network dynamics
• The stabilization of equilibria in evolutionary game dynamics through mutation: mutation limits in evolutionary games
• Evolutionary games under incompetence

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