Evolutionary stability in asymmetric games

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90041-FzbMath0770.90096OpenAlexW3124637403MaRDI QIDQ1201143

Publication date: 17 January 1993

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90041-f

zbMATH Keywords

asymptotic stability strict Nash equilibrium asymmetric playes evolutionary selection game strictly dominated strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23)

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