Asymmetric evolutionary game dynamics based on individuals' own volition
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Publication:1714166
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.05.012zbMath1406.91036OpenAlexW2809428546WikidataQ56976950 ScholiaQ56976950MaRDI QIDQ1714166
Qiao-Qiao He, Ting Ji, Yi Tao, Tian-Jiao Feng, Bo-Yu Zhang
Publication date: 31 January 2019
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2018.05.012
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