A simple rule of direct reciprocity leads to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection in the prisoner's dilemma game
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Cites work
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- Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation
- Evolutionary game dynamics with non-uniform interaction rates
- Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
- Evolutionary stability and quasi-stationary strategy in stochastic evolutionary game dynamics
- Game-theoretical models in biology
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
- Know when to walk away: contingent movement and the evolution of cooperation
- Leave and let leave: a sufficient condition to explain the evolutionary emergence of cooperation
- Paradox of the evolution of communication and of social interactivity.
- Repeated games and direct reciprocity under active linking
- The calculus of selfishness.
- The diffusion approximation of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics: mean effective fixation time and the significance of the one-third law
- The evolution of cooperation
- The option to leave: conditional dissociation in the evolution of cooperation
- Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
Cited in
(18)- Asymmetric evolutionary game dynamics based on individuals' own volition
- Optional interactions and suspicious behaviour facilitates trustful cooperation in prisoners dilemma
- The opportunity cost of walking away in the spatial iterated prisoner's dilemma
- Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players
- Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present
- Evolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent
- Game theory and the evolution of cooperation
- Optimal tag-based cooperation control for the ``prisoner's dilemma
- Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option
- Examining the role of individual movement in promoting coexistence in a spatially explicit prisoner's dilemma
- The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence
- Heterogeneous cooperative belief for social dilemma in multi-agent system
- The consequences of switching strategies in a two-player iterated survival game
- Disbandment rule sways the evolution of tolerance
- Evolution of spite in an n-player game with an opting-out option
- Bilateral negotiation facilitates stable coexistence of cooperation with defection in Prisoner's dilemma game
- Disbandment rules that most facilitate the evolution of cooperation
- Evolution of spite versus evolution of altruism through a disbandment mechanism
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