A simple rule of direct reciprocity leads to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection in the prisoner's dilemma game (Q2402502)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6770860
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| English | A simple rule of direct reciprocity leads to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection in the prisoner's dilemma game |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6770860 |
Statements
A simple rule of direct reciprocity leads to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection in the prisoner's dilemma game (English)
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8 September 2017
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evolution of cooperation
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long-term stable coexistence of cooperation and defection
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out-for-tat (OFT)
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tit-for-tat (TFT)
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0.88953173
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0.8657235
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0.8542225
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0.84719115
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0.84587157
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0.8439597
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