Pages that link to "Item:Q2402502"

The following pages link to A simple rule of direct reciprocity leads to the stable coexistence of cooperation and defection in the prisoner's dilemma game (Q2402502):

Displaying 14 items.

• Asymmetric evolutionary game dynamics based on individuals' own volition (Q1714166) (← links)
• Optional interactions and suspicious behaviour facilitates trustful cooperation in prisoners dilemma (Q1749007) (← links)
• The opportunity cost of walking away in the spatial iterated prisoner's dilemma (Q1999485) (← links)
• Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players (Q2009251) (← links)
• Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present (Q2029549) (← links)
• Evolution of trustfulness in the case where resources for cooperation are sometimes absent (Q2152688) (← links)
• Game theory and the evolution of cooperation (Q2158117) (← links)
• Optimal tag-based cooperation control for the ``prisoner's dilemma'' (Q2225587) (← links)
• Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option (Q2324874) (← links)
• The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence (Q2404001) (← links)
• Heterogeneous cooperative belief for social dilemma in multi-agent system (Q2423011) (← links)
• The consequences of switching strategies in a two-player iterated survival game (Q2659039) (← links)
• Disbandment rule sways the evolution of tolerance (Q2662533) (← links)
• Evolution of spite in an n-player game with an opting-out option (Q6078377) (← links)