The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.03.021zbMath1370.92108OpenAlexW2601986337WikidataQ47332249 ScholiaQ47332249MaRDI QIDQ2404001

Shun Kurokawa

Publication date: 12 September 2017

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.03.021

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theoryreciprocityiterated prisoner's dilemmaperceptionimperfect informationstrong belief

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Applications of game theory (91A80) Animal behavior (92D50)

Related Items (9)

Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions ⋮ Impacts of memory on a regular lattice for different population sizes with asynchronous update in spatial snowdrift game ⋮ Optional interactions and suspicious behaviour facilitates trustful cooperation in prisoners dilemma ⋮ How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence ⋮ Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players ⋮ Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present ⋮ Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option ⋮ How much cost should reciprocators pay in order to distinguish the opponent's cooperation from the opponent's defection? ⋮ Reputation preferences resolve social dilemmas in spatial multigames

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