The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence
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Publication:2404001
DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.03.021zbMath1370.92108OpenAlexW2601986337WikidataQ47332249 ScholiaQ47332249MaRDI QIDQ2404001
Publication date: 12 September 2017
Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2017.03.021
evolutionary game theoryreciprocityiterated prisoner's dilemmaperceptionimperfect informationstrong belief
Related Items (9)
Evolution of groupwise cooperation: generosity, paradoxical behavior, and non-linear payoff functions ⋮ Impacts of memory on a regular lattice for different population sizes with asynchronous update in spatial snowdrift game ⋮ Optional interactions and suspicious behaviour facilitates trustful cooperation in prisoners dilemma ⋮ How memory cost, switching cost, and payoff non-linearity affect the evolution of persistence ⋮ Cooperation evolves more when players keep the interaction with unknown players ⋮ Effect of the group size on the evolution of cooperation when an exit option is present ⋮ Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option ⋮ How much cost should reciprocators pay in order to distinguish the opponent's cooperation from the opponent's defection? ⋮ Reputation preferences resolve social dilemmas in spatial multigames
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