On the robustness of the extension of the one-third law of evolution to the multi-player game

DOI10.1007/S13235-011-0010-YzbMATH Open1252.91017OpenAlexW1988364033MaRDI QIDQ692099FDOQ692099

Authors: Sabin Lessard 

Publication date: 4 December 2012

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0010-y

Recommendations

• The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics
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• Fixation in large populations: a continuous view of a discrete problem
• Fixation probabilities in evolutionary game dynamics with a two-strategy game in finite diploid populations

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary gamesfixation probabilityexchangeable modelsmulti-player gameone-third law of evolutionprojected average excess

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• The coalescent
• Coalescents with multiple collisions
• The general coalescent with asynchronous mergers of ancestral lines
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The latent roots of certain Markov chains arising in genetics: A new approach, I. Haploid models
• The probability of fixation of a single mutant in an exchangeable selection model
• Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process
• Long-term stability from fixation probabilities in finite populations: New perspectives for ESS theory
• Fixation probability with multiple alleles and projected average allelic effect on selection
• Total variation distances and rates of convergence for ancestral coalescent processes in exchangeable population models

Cited In (26)

• Population dynamics and games of variable size
• Fixation in large populations: a continuous view of a discrete problem
• Fitness-based models and pairwise comparison models of evolutionary games are typically different—even in unstructured populations
• Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite continental island population model and emergence of cooperation
• Science, technology and institutional change in knowledge production: an evolutionary game theoretic framework
• The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence
• How much cost should reciprocators pay in order to distinguish the opponent's cooperation from the opponent's defection?
• Evolution of group-wise cooperation: is direct reciprocity insufficient?
• First-order effect of frequency-dependent selection on fixation probability in an age-structured population with application to a public goods game
• Evolutionary and convergence stability for continuous phenotypes in finite populations derived from two-allele models
• Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas with assortment in finite populations
• Time to extinction of a cultural trait in an overlapping generation model
• The average abundance function with mutation of the multi-player snowdrift evolutionary game model
• One-third rules with equality: second-order evolutionary stability conditions in finite populations
• From fixation probabilities to \(d\)-player games: an inverse problem in evolutionary dynamics
• The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics
• Dynamic properties of evolutionary multi-player games in finite populations
• The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory
• Fixation probabilities in populations under demographic fluctuations
• Evolutionary multiplayer games
• On equilibrium properties of evolutionary multi-player games with random payoff matrices
• Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option
• Persistence extends reciprocity
• Assortment by group founders always promotes the evolution of cooperation under global selection but can oppose it under local selection
• The diffusion approximation of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics: mean effective fixation time and the significance of the one-third law
• Disentangling eco-evolutionary effects on trait fixation

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