On the robustness of the extension of the one-third law of evolution to the multi-player game

DOI10.1007/s13235-011-0010-yzbMath1252.91017OpenAlexW1988364033MaRDI QIDQ692099

Sabin Lessard

Publication date: 4 December 2012

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0010-y

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary gamesfixation probabilityexchangeable modelsmulti-player gameone-third law of evolutionprojected average excess

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (22)

Disentangling eco-evolutionary effects on trait fixation ⋮ Evolutionary and convergence stability for continuous phenotypes in finite populations derived from two-allele models ⋮ The average abundance function with mutation of the multi-player snowdrift evolutionary game model ⋮ The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence ⋮ The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory ⋮ First-order effect of frequency-dependent selection on fixation probability in an age-structured population with application to a public goods game ⋮ Assortment by group founders always promotes the evolution of cooperation under global selection but can oppose it under local selection ⋮ Fixation in large populations: a continuous view of a discrete problem ⋮ Persistence extends reciprocity ⋮ On equilibrium properties of evolutionary multi-player games with random payoff matrices ⋮ The diffusion approximation of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics: mean effective fixation time and the significance of the one-third law ⋮ Evolution of group-wise cooperation: is direct reciprocity insufficient? ⋮ Fixation probabilities in populations under demographic fluctuations ⋮ From fixation probabilities to \(d\)-player games: an inverse problem in evolutionary dynamics ⋮ Time to extinction of a cultural trait in an overlapping generation model ⋮ Fitness-based models and pairwise comparison models of evolutionary games are typically different—even in unstructured populations ⋮ Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option ⋮ How much cost should reciprocators pay in order to distinguish the opponent's cooperation from the opponent's defection? ⋮ Science, technology and institutional change in knowledge production: an evolutionary game theoretic framework ⋮ Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite continental island population model and emergence of cooperation ⋮ Evolutionary multiplayer games ⋮ Dynamic properties of evolutionary multi-player games in finite populations

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Fixation probability with multiple alleles and projected average allelic effect on selection
• The coalescent
• Coalescents with multiple collisions
• The probability of fixation of a single mutant in an exchangeable selection model
• Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process
• Long-term stability from fixation probabilities in finite populations: New perspectives for ESS theory
• Total variation distances and rates of convergence for ancestral coalescent processes in exchangeable population models
• The latent roots of certain Markov chains arising in genetics: A new approach, I. Haploid models
• The general coalescent with asynchronous mergers of ancestral lines

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