On the robustness of the extension of the one-third law of evolution to the multi-player game
From MaRDI portal
Publication:692099
DOI10.1007/s13235-011-0010-yzbMath1252.91017MaRDI QIDQ692099
Publication date: 4 December 2012
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-011-0010-y
evolutionary games; fixation probability; exchangeable models; multi-player game; one-third law of evolution; projected average excess
91A22: Evolutionary games
Related Items
Evolutionary and convergence stability for continuous phenotypes in finite populations derived from two-allele models, Persistence extends reciprocity, The diffusion approximation of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics: mean effective fixation time and the significance of the one-third law, Fixation in large populations: a continuous view of a discrete problem, Disentangling eco-evolutionary effects on trait fixation, On equilibrium properties of evolutionary multi-player games with random payoff matrices, Fixation probabilities in populations under demographic fluctuations, Evolution of group-wise cooperation: is direct reciprocity insufficient?, Time to extinction of a cultural trait in an overlapping generation model, Science, technology and institutional change in knowledge production: an evolutionary game theoretic framework, Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite continental island population model and emergence of cooperation, The average abundance function with mutation of the multi-player snowdrift evolutionary game model, First-order effect of frequency-dependent selection on fixation probability in an age-structured population with application to a public goods game, From fixation probabilities to \(d\)-player games: an inverse problem in evolutionary dynamics, Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option, How much cost should reciprocators pay in order to distinguish the opponent's cooperation from the opponent's defection?, Evolutionary multiplayer games, Dynamic properties of evolutionary multi-player games in finite populations, The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence, The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory, Fitness-based models and pairwise comparison models of evolutionary games are typically different—even in unstructured populations
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Fixation probability with multiple alleles and projected average allelic effect on selection
- The coalescent
- Coalescents with multiple collisions
- The probability of fixation of a single mutant in an exchangeable selection model
- Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process
- Long-term stability from fixation probabilities in finite populations: New perspectives for ESS theory
- Total variation distances and rates of convergence for ancestral coalescent processes in exchangeable population models
- The latent roots of certain Markov chains arising in genetics: A new approach, I. Haploid models
- The general coalescent with asynchronous mergers of ancestral lines
