On the robustness of the extension of the one-third law of evolution to the multi-player game
From MaRDI portal
Publication:692099
Recommendations
- The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics
- One-third rules with equality: second-order evolutionary stability conditions in finite populations
- The diffusion approximation of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics: mean effective fixation time and the significance of the one-third law
- Fixation in large populations: a continuous view of a discrete problem
- Fixation probabilities in evolutionary game dynamics with a two-strategy game in finite diploid populations
Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148873 (Why is no real title available?)
- Coalescents with multiple collisions
- Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process
- Fixation probability with multiple alleles and projected average allelic effect on selection
- Long-term stability from fixation probabilities in finite populations: New perspectives for ESS theory
- The coalescent
- The general coalescent with asynchronous mergers of ancestral lines
- The latent roots of certain Markov chains arising in genetics: A new approach, I. Haploid models
- The probability of fixation of a single mutant in an exchangeable selection model
- Total variation distances and rates of convergence for ancestral coalescent processes in exchangeable population models
Cited in
(26)- Population dynamics and games of variable size
- On equilibrium properties of evolutionary multi-player games with random payoff matrices
- Evolutionary and convergence stability for continuous phenotypes in finite populations derived from two-allele models
- Time to extinction of a cultural trait in an overlapping generation model
- One-third rules with equality: second-order evolutionary stability conditions in finite populations
- The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory
- The extended reciprocity: strong belief outperforms persistence
- Fitness-based models and pairwise comparison models of evolutionary games are typically different—even in unstructured populations
- First-order effect of frequency-dependent selection on fixation probability in an age-structured population with application to a public goods game
- Disentangling eco-evolutionary effects on trait fixation
- Fixation in large populations: a continuous view of a discrete problem
- The average abundance function with mutation of the multi-player snowdrift evolutionary game model
- Three-player repeated games with an opt-out option
- The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics
- Evolution of group-wise cooperation: is direct reciprocity insufficient?
- Evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas with assortment in finite populations
- Fixation probabilities in populations under demographic fluctuations
- Persistence extends reciprocity
- Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite continental island population model and emergence of cooperation
- Science, technology and institutional change in knowledge production: an evolutionary game theoretic framework
- Dynamic properties of evolutionary multi-player games in finite populations
- How much cost should reciprocators pay in order to distinguish the opponent's cooperation from the opponent's defection?
- The diffusion approximation of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics: mean effective fixation time and the significance of the one-third law
- Assortment by group founders always promotes the evolution of cooperation under global selection but can oppose it under local selection
- From fixation probabilities to \(d\)-player games: an inverse problem in evolutionary dynamics
- Evolutionary multiplayer games
This page was built for publication: On the robustness of the extension of the one-third law of evolution to the multi-player game
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q692099)
