Science, technology and institutional change in knowledge production: an evolutionary game theoretic framework

DOI10.1007/S13235-021-00416-WMaRDI QIDQ2105700zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors O. Aydogmus, Erkan Gürpinar

Publication date 8 December 2022

Published in Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-021-00416-w

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary gamestechnologymultiplayer gamesscienceintellectual propertytacit knowledge

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Evolutionary games (91A22) Economics of information (91B44)

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Cites work

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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2017728 (Why is no real title available?)
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• On the robustness of the extension of the one-third law of evolution to the multi-player game
• Probability. Theory and examples.
• The Management of Innovation
• The replicator equation and other game dynamics

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