Dynamic properties of evolutionary multi-player games in finite populations
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Publication:2351219
DOI10.3390/g4020182zbMath1314.91039MaRDI QIDQ2351219
Chaitanya S. Gokhale, Bin Wu, Arne Traulsen
Publication date: 23 June 2015
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g4020182
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