The probability of fixation of a single mutant in an exchangeable selection model

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Publication:2373246

DOI10.1007/s00285-007-0069-7zbMath1115.92046OpenAlexW1998952578WikidataQ51924550 ScholiaQ51924550MaRDI QIDQ2373246

Sabin Lessard, Véronique Ladret

Publication date: 17 July 2007

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00285-007-0069-7




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