The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory

DOI10.1007/S00285-017-1119-4MaRDI QIDQ2409178zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Christine Sample, Benjamin Allen

Publication date 11 October 2017

Published in Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.07081

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryMoran processsocial behaviorselection strength

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of Markov chains and discrete-time Markov processes on general state spaces (social mobility, learning theory, industrial processes, etc.) (60J20) Problems related to evolution (92D15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Abstract: Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical approach to studying how social behaviors evolve. In many recent works, evolutionary competition between strategies is modeled as a stochastic process in a finite population. In this context, two limits are both mathematically convenient and biologically relevant: weak selection and large population size. These limits can be combined in different ways, leading to potentially different results. We consider two orderings: the wN limit, in which weak selection is applied before the large population limit, and the Nw limit, in which the order is reversed. Formal mathematical definitions of the Nw and wN limits are provided. Applying these definitions to the Moran process of evolutionary game theory, we obtain asymptotic expressions for fixation probability and conditions for success in these limits. We find that the asymptotic expressions for fixation probability, and the conditions for a strategy to be favored over a neutral mutation, are different in the Nw and wN limits. However, the ordering of limits does not affect the conditions for one strategy to be favored over another.

Recommendations

• The different limits of weak selection and the evolutionary dynamics of finite populations
• Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process
• Evolutionary game dynamics of the Wright-Fisher process with different selection intensities
• Fixation probabilities of strategies for bimatrix games in finite populations
• Strong migration limit for games in structured populations: applications to dominance hierarchy and set structure

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3835792 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148873 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 903638 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3273551 (Why is no real title available?)
• A stochastic behavioral model and a `microscopic' foundation of evolutionary game theory
• Bounds on variances of recovery times of decision feedback equalizers
• Diffusion models in population genetics
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Evolutionary game dynamics in a Wright-Fisher process
• Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite asymmetric two-deme population and emergence of cooperation
• Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations
• Fitness-based models and pairwise comparison models of evolutionary games are typically different—even in unstructured populations
• Fixation of strategies for an evolutionary game in finite populations
• Game-theoretical models in biology
• Games on graphs
• On the robustness of the extension of the one-third law of evolution to the multi-player game
• One-third rules with equality: second-order evolutionary stability conditions in finite populations
• Optional games on cycles and complete graphs
• Pairwise comparison and selection temperature in evolutionary game dynamics
• Real variable contributions of G. C. Young and W. H. Young
• Sharp benefit-to-cost rules for the evolution of cooperation on regular graphs
• Strategy selection in structured populations
• The diffusion approximation of stochastic evolutionary game dynamics: mean effective fixation time and the significance of the one-third law
• The logic of animal conflict
• The one-third law of evolutionary dynamics
• The probability of fixation of a single mutant in an exchangeable selection model
• The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction

Cited in

(15)

• Game-theoretical approach for opinion dynamics on social networks
• Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite continental island population model and emergence of cooperation
• An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
• Imperfect strategy transmission can reverse the role of population viscosity on the evolution of altruism
• A mathematical formalism for natural selection with arbitrary spatial and genetic structure
• The evolution of collaboration in symmetric \(2\times 2\)-games with imperfect recognition of types
• Evolutionary games on the torus with weak selection
• Fixation probabilities and hitting times for low levels of frequency-dependent selection
• Extreme selection unifies evolutionary game dynamics in finite and infinite populations
• Fixation probabilities in evolutionary dynamics under weak selection
• Extrapolating weak selection in evolutionary games
• The different limits of weak selection and the evolutionary dynamics of finite populations
• Fixation probabilities in populations under demographic fluctuations
• Fixation probabilities for the Moran process in evolutionary games with two strategies: graph shapes and large population asymptotics
• Is cooperation sustained under increased mixing in evolutionary public goods games on networks?

This page was built for publication: The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2409178)