The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory

DOI10.1007/S00285-017-1119-4zbMATH Open1378.91029arXiv1610.07081OpenAlexW2995598646WikidataQ47225093 ScholiaQ47225093MaRDI QIDQ2409178FDOQ2409178

Authors: Christine Sample, Benjamin Allen 

Publication date: 11 October 2017

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: Evolutionary game theory is a mathematical approach to studying how social behaviors evolve. In many recent works, evolutionary competition between strategies is modeled as a stochastic process in a finite population. In this context, two limits are both mathematically convenient and biologically relevant: weak selection and large population size. These limits can be combined in different ways, leading to potentially different results. We consider two orderings: the wN limit, in which weak selection is applied before the large population limit, and the Nw limit, in which the order is reversed. Formal mathematical definitions of the Nw and wN limits are provided. Applying these definitions to the Moran process of evolutionary game theory, we obtain asymptotic expressions for fixation probability and conditions for success in these limits. We find that the asymptotic expressions for fixation probability, and the conditions for a strategy to be favored over a neutral mutation, are different in the Nw and wN limits. However, the ordering of limits does not affect the conditions for one strategy to be favored over another.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.07081

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zbMATH Keywords

game theoryMoran processsocial behaviorselection strength

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of Markov chains and discrete-time Markov processes on general state spaces (social mobility, learning theory, industrial processes, etc.) (60J20) Problems related to evolution (92D15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cited In (15)

• Game-theoretical approach for opinion dynamics on social networks
• Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite continental island population model and emergence of cooperation
• An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics
• Imperfect strategy transmission can reverse the role of population viscosity on the evolution of altruism
• A mathematical formalism for natural selection with arbitrary spatial and genetic structure
• The evolution of collaboration in symmetric \(2\times 2\)-games with imperfect recognition of types
• Fixation probabilities and hitting times for low levels of frequency-dependent selection
• Evolutionary games on the torus with weak selection
• Extreme selection unifies evolutionary game dynamics in finite and infinite populations
• Fixation probabilities in evolutionary dynamics under weak selection
• Extrapolating weak selection in evolutionary games
• The different limits of weak selection and the evolutionary dynamics of finite populations
• Fixation probabilities in populations under demographic fluctuations
• Fixation probabilities for the Moran process in evolutionary games with two strategies: graph shapes and large population asymptotics
• Is cooperation sustained under increased mixing in evolutionary public goods games on networks?

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