The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory

DOI10.1007/s00285-017-1119-4zbMath1378.91029arXiv1610.07081OpenAlexW2995598646WikidataQ47225093 ScholiaQ47225093MaRDI QIDQ2409178

Christine Sample, Benjamin L. Allen

Publication date: 11 October 2017

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.07081

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryMoran processsocial behaviorselection strength

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Applications of Markov chains and discrete-time Markov processes on general state spaces (social mobility, learning theory, industrial processes, etc.) (60J20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (12)

Extreme selection unifies evolutionary game dynamics in finite and infinite populations ⋮ Imperfect strategy transmission can reverse the role of population viscosity on the evolution of altruism ⋮ Fixation probabilities and hitting times for low levels of frequency-dependent selection ⋮ Fixation probabilities in evolutionary dynamics under weak selection ⋮ Fixation probabilities for the Moran process in evolutionary games with two strategies: graph shapes and large population asymptotics ⋮ A mathematical formalism for natural selection with arbitrary spatial and genetic structure ⋮ The evolution of collaboration in symmetric \(2\times 2\)-games with imperfect recognition of types ⋮ Extrapolating weak selection in evolutionary games ⋮ Fixation probabilities in populations under demographic fluctuations ⋮ An introduction to \textit{ABED}: agent-based simulation of evolutionary game dynamics ⋮ Is cooperation sustained under increased mixing in evolutionary public goods games on networks? ⋮ Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite continental island population model and emergence of cooperation

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