Sharp benefit-to-cost rules for the evolution of cooperation on regular graphs

DOI10.1214/12-AAP849zbMATH Open1267.91019arXiv1107.1513MaRDI QIDQ1948699FDOQ1948699

Authors: Yu-Ting Chen 

Publication date: 24 April 2013

Published in: The Annals of Applied Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: We study two of the simple rules on finite graphs under the death-birth updating and the imitation updating discovered by Ohtsuki, Hauert, Lieberman and Nowak [Nature 441 (2006) 502-505]. Each rule specifies a payoff-ratio cutoff point for the magnitude of fixation probabilities of the underlying evolutionary game between cooperators and defectors. We view the Markov chains associated with the two updating mechanisms as voter model perturbations. Then we present a first-order approximation for fixation probabilities of general voter model perturbations on finite graphs subject to small perturbation in terms of the voter model fixation probabilities. In the context of regular graphs, we obtain algebraically explicit first-order approximations for the fixation probabilities of cooperators distributed as certain uniform distributions. These approximations lead to a rigorous proof that both of the rules of Ohtsuki et al. are valid and are sharp.

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1107.1513

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zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theoryinteracting particle systemsvoter modelevolution of cooperationcoalescing random walksperturbations of Markov chainsvoter model perturbations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of continuous-time Markov processes on discrete state spaces (60J28) Markov chains (discrete-time Markov processes on discrete state spaces) (60J10) Interacting random processes; statistical mechanics type models; percolation theory (60K35) Cooperative games (91A12) Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Evolutionary games (91A22) Games involving graphs (91A43)

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Cited In (17)

• Game-theoretical approach for opinion dynamics on social networks
• Evolutionary game dynamics in a finite continental island population model and emergence of cooperation
• Evolutionary games on the lattice: death and birth of the fittest
• A mathematical formalism for natural selection with arbitrary spatial and genetic structure
• Large fluctuations in anti-coordination games on scale-free graphs
• Wright-Fisher diffusions in stochastic spatial evolutionary games with death-birth updating
• Weak atomic convergence of finite voter models toward Fleming-Viot processes
• Games among relatives revisited
• Meeting, coalescence and consensus time on random directed graphs
• Local interactions promote cooperation in cooperator-defector systems
• Defectors for high degree with adaptive interactions
• Fixation probabilities in evolutionary dynamics under weak selection
• Evolutionary games on graphs and discrete dynamical systems
• The replicator equation in stochastic spatial evolutionary games
• Evolutionary games on the lattice: payoffs affecting birth and death rates
• The limits of weak selection and large population size in evolutionary game theory
• Evolution of cooperation for multiple mutant configurations on all regular graphs with \(N \leq 14\) players

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