Sharp benefit-to-cost rules for the evolution of cooperation on regular graphs

DOI10.1214/12-AAP849zbMath1267.91019arXiv1107.1513MaRDI QIDQ1948699

Yu-Ting Chen

Publication date: 24 April 2013

Published in: The Annals of Applied Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1107.1513

zbMATH Keywords

coalescing random walksvoter modelevolutionary game theoryinteracting particle systemsevolution of cooperationperturbations of Markov chainsvoter model perturbations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social networks; opinion dynamics (91D30) Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Interacting random processes; statistical mechanics type models; percolation theory (60K35) Markov chains (discrete-time Markov processes on discrete state spaces) (60J10) Evolutionary games (91A22) Applications of continuous-time Markov processes on discrete state spaces (60J28)

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