Local interactions promote cooperation in cooperator-defector systems

zbMath1488.60238arXiv1805.06421MaRDI QIDQ3121502

Nicolas. Lanchier

Publication date: 18 March 2019

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1805.06421

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theory; prisoner's dilemma; cooperator; defector; block construction; multi-type contact process; oriented site percolation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

60K35: Interacting random processes; statistical mechanics type models; percolation theory

91A22: Evolutionary games

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