Evolutionary games on the lattice: death and birth of the fittest

zbMath1361.60091arXiv1605.04037MaRDI QIDQ2974534

Eric Foxall, Nicolas. Lanchier

Publication date: 10 April 2017

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1605.04037

zbMATH Keywords

interacting particle systems; evolutionary games; prisoner's dilemma; replicator equation; evolutionary stable strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

60K35: Interacting random processes; statistical mechanics type models; percolation theory

91A22: Evolutionary games

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Moran-type bounds for the fixation probability in a frequency-dependent Wright-Fisher model, Local interactions promote cooperation in cooperator-defector systems

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