Evolutionary games on the lattice: best-response dynamics

DOI10.1214/EJP.V19-3126MaRDI QIDQ743501zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Stephen Evilsizor, N. Lanchier

Publication date 24 September 2014

Published in Electronic Journal of Probability (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://arxiv.org/abs/1310.5192

zbMATH Keywords

interacting particle systemsbootstrap percolationevolutionary stable strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Interacting random processes; statistical mechanics type models; percolation theory (60K35) Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Abstract: The best-response dynamics is an example of an evolutionary game where players update their strategy in order to maximize their payoff. The main objective of this paper is to study a stochastic spatial version of this game based on the framework of interacting particle systems in which players are located on an infinite square lattice. In the presence of two strategies, and calling a strategy selfish or altruistic depending on a certain ordering of the coefficients of the underlying payoff matrix, a simple analysis of the non-spatial mean-field approximation of the spatial model shows that a strategy is evolutionary stable if and only if it is selfish, making the system bistable when both strategies are selfish. The spatial and non-spatial models agree when at least one strategy is altruistic. In contrast, we prove that, in the presence of two selfish strategies and in any spatial dimensions, only the most selfish strategy remains evolutionary stable. The main ingredients of the proof are monotonicity results and a coupling between the best-response dynamics properly rescaled in space with bootstrap percolation to compare the infinite time limits of both systems.

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• Evolutionary games on the lattice: payoffs affecting birth and death rates
• Best-response dynamics for evolutionary stochastic games

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