BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS IN A BIRTH-DEATH MODEL OF EVOLUTION IN GAMES

DOI10.1142/S021919891000260XzbMath1203.91027OpenAlexW2146812417MaRDI QIDQ3067895

Ilja Neustadt, Carlos Alós-Ferrer

Publication date: 13 January 2011

Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919891000260x

zbMATH Keywords

learningcoordination gamesmutationbirth-death processes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Branching processes (Galton-Watson, birth-and-death, etc.) (60J80)

Related Items (3)

Large population limits for evolutionary dynamics with random matching ⋮ Convergence of linear threshold decision-making dynamics in finite heterogeneous populations ⋮ Tributes to Bill Sandholm

Cites Work

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• Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution
• The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
• How noise matters.
• The statistical mechanics of best-response strategy revision
• Finite Population Dynamics and Mixed Equilibria
• Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Learning in games by random sampling

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