BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS IN A BIRTH-DEATH MODEL OF EVOLUTION IN GAMES
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Publication:3067895
DOI10.1142/S021919891000260XzbMath1203.91027OpenAlexW2146812417MaRDI QIDQ3067895
Ilja Neustadt, Carlos Alós-Ferrer
Publication date: 13 January 2011
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1142/s021919891000260x
Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Branching processes (Galton-Watson, birth-and-death, etc.) (60J80)
Related Items (3)
Large population limits for evolutionary dynamics with random matching ⋮ Convergence of linear threshold decision-making dynamics in finite heterogeneous populations ⋮ Tributes to Bill Sandholm
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- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
- The Evolution of Conventions
- Learning in games by random sampling
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