Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(98)00163-3zbMath0914.90280OpenAlexW2009132507MaRDI QIDQ1274643

William H. Sandholm

Publication date: 12 January 1999

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00163-3

zbMATH Keywords

decision rulesMarkov chainslearningNash equilibriumequilibrium selectionevolutionmutationslong run equilibriarisk dominant equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items

Imitation processes with small mutations, Large population limits for evolutionary dynamics with random matching, Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation, Imitation, local interactions, and efficiency, Learning, bounded memory, and inertia, Constrained interactions and social coordination, Coordination with heterogeneous interaction constraints, Mutation rates and equilibrium selection under stochastic evolutionary dynamics, Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations, Imitation with asymmetric memory, Partial bandwagon effects and local interactions, Evolutionary Game Theory, When are efficient conventions selected in networks?, Contagion and efficiency, Prospect dynamics and loss dominance, Robust stochastic stability, The logit-response dynamics, Evolutionary game dynamics, BEST-RESPONSE DYNAMICS IN A BIRTH-DEATH MODEL OF EVOLUTION IN GAMES, Coordination games and local interactions: a survey of the game theoretic literature, Tributes to Bill Sandholm, Waiting times in evolutionary dynamics with time-decreasing noise

Cites Work

• Evolution of equilibria in the long run: A general theory and applications
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• A Comment on "Learning, Mutation, and Long-Run Equilibria in Games"