A Comment on "Learning, Mutation, and Long-Run Equilibria in Games"

DOI10.2307/2171792zbMath0873.90132OpenAlexW2328927542MaRDI QIDQ5690047

Mark Stegeman, Paul Rhode

Publication date: 15 January 1997

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2171792

zbMATH Keywords

Darwinian dynamics

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

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Stochastic Darwinian equilibria in small and large populations, Long-run equilibria with dominated strategies, Evolutionary game dynamics in finite populations with strong selection and weak mutation, Learning, bounded memory, and inertia, Imitation with asymmetric memory, A finite population ESS and a long run equilibrium in an \(n\) players coordination game, Evolutionary Game Theory, Prospect dynamics and loss dominance, Robust stochastic stability, Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution, The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences.