Long-run equilibria with dominated strategies

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.07.005zbMath1197.91046OpenAlexW1972416696MaRDI QIDQ844928

Chongmin Kim, Kam-Chau Wong

Publication date: 5 February 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.005

zbMATH Keywords

dominated strategieslong-run equilibriumbest response process

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (6)

Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in normal form games ⋮ Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions ⋮ Coordination and culture ⋮ Local interactions under switching costs ⋮ A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games ⋮ Coordination games and local interactions: a survey of the game theoretic literature

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