Long-run equilibria with dominated strategies
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3826915 (Why is no real title available?)
- A Comment on "Learning, Mutation, and Long-Run Equilibria in Games"
- A multinomial probit model of stochastic evolution.
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Cited in
(10)- On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations
- Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions
- Coordination games and local interactions: a survey of the game theoretic literature
- STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA WITH PARTIALLY CONSUMABLE WITHHOLDINGS
- Coordination and culture
- Local interactions under switching costs
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 592673 (Why is no real title available?)
- Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
- A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games
- Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in normal form games
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