Long-run equilibria with dominated strategies

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2009.07.005zbMATH Open1197.91046OpenAlexW1972416696MaRDI QIDQ844928FDOQ844928

Authors: Chongmin Kim, Kam-Chau Wong 

Publication date: 5 February 2010

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2009.07.005

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zbMATH Keywords

dominated strategieslong-run equilibriumbest response process

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Cites Work

• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The Evolution of Conventions
• Equilibrium selection in coordination games with simultaneous play.
• On the relationship between risk-dominance and stochastic stability
• Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
• Efficient equilibrium selection in evolutionary games with random matching
• Evolution of equilibria in the long run: A general theory and applications
• A multinomial probit model of stochastic evolution.
• A Comment on "Learning, Mutation, and Long-Run Equilibria in Games"
• Evolution and long run equilibria in coordination games with summary statistic payoff technologies

Cited In (10)

• Coordination and culture
• Local interactions under switching costs
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• On the elimination of dominated strategies in stochastic models of evolution with large populations
• Long-run equilibria, dominated strategies, and local interactions
• Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in normal form games
• Coordination games and local interactions: a survey of the game theoretic literature
• Revisiting the foundations of dominant-strategy mechanisms
• A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games
• STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA WITH PARTIALLY CONSUMABLE WITHHOLDINGS

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