Evolution and long run equilibria in coordination games with summary statistic payoff technologies

DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2274MaRDI QIDQ1367769zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jack Robles

Publication date 5 November 1998

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2274

zbMATH Keywords

class coordination gamesset of long run equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Stochastic games, stochastic differential games (91A15)

Recommendations

• Evolution of equilibria in the long run: A general theory and applications
• Equilibrium selection in coordination games with simultaneous play.
• A finite population ESS and a long run equilibrium in an n players coordination game

Cites work

• Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games
• An evolutionary interpretation of Van Huyck, Battalio, and Beil's experimental results on coordination
• Evolution of equilibria in the long run: A general theory and applications
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• Stochastic stability in games with alternative best replies
• Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games
• The Evolution of Conventions

Cited in

(8)

• Evolution with changing mutation rates
• Equilibrium selection in coordination games with simultaneous play.
• Evolution of equilibria in the long run: A general theory and applications
• History as a coordination device
• A finite population ESS and a long run equilibrium in an n players coordination game
• WHEN ASPIRING AND RATIONAL AGENTS STRIVE TO COORDINATE
• Evolution in finitely repeated coordination games
• Long-run equilibria with dominated strategies

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