Evolution in finitely repeated coordination games
The author investigates evolutions of finitely repeated coordination games (i.e., every action \(a\) for player I in the stage game has a counteraction \(b\) such that \(\langle a,b\rangle\) is an equilibrium, and similarly for player II) with common interest (i.e., there is a pair of actions that is optimal for both players) via mutations and updating. The definitions and techniques of evolution via mutations and updating are from the works of \textit{M. Kandori, G. J. Mailath} and \textit{R. Rob} [Econometrica 61, 29-56 (1993; Zbl 0776.90095)] and \textit{G. Nöldeke} and \textit{L. Samuelson} [Games Econ. Behav. 5, 425-454 (1993; Zbl 0820.90144); J. Econ. Theory 73, 118-156 (1997; Zbl 0872.90023)]. In this situation, the author gives a lower bound for the expected payoff of evolutionary stable states and proves that a population that reaches an evolutionary stable set of states will not leave it (Proposition 3). As the author mentions (p.323), the results in this paper are closely related to results of Balkenborg.
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