Another approach to mutation and learning games

DOI10.1006/GAME.1996.0041MaRDI QIDQ1817251zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Madjid Amir, Siegfried K. Berninghaus

Publication date 1 December 1996

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1996.0041

zbMATH Keywords

continuous timedynamic steady-state equilibriaevolutionary normal-form gamepresence of mutations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Memory and learning in psychology (91E40) Model systems in control theory (93C99)

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Cited in

(14)

• Evolution in finitely repeated coordination games
• Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games
• The effect of increasing returns to scale in public goods investment on threshold values of cooperation under social exclusion mechanism
• Fixation and escape times in stochastic game learning
• A QBD approach to evolutionary game theory
• Evolutionary game dynamics of the Wright-Fisher process with different selection intensities
• On the convergence of evolution processes with time-varying mutations and local interaction
• Muddling through: Noisy equilibrium selection
• Stochastic dynamics and stable equilibrium of evolutionary optional public goods game in finite populations
• The consequences of switching strategies in a two-player iterated survival game
• Evolution of knowledge sharing behavior in social commerce: an agent-based computational approach
• The stabilization of equilibria in evolutionary game dynamics through mutation: mutation limits in evolutionary games
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• Large deviations and equilibrium selection in large populations

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